Until October 1997, firms going public in Japan were required to use a hybrid auction process where at least half of the issue (the "auction tranche") was offered via discriminatory auction. Remaining shares (the "public offer tranche") were sold days later by firm commitment at a fixed price. We document underpricing and partial adjustment of IPO public offer prices in Japan's auction regime, a regime where: investor information differences are not important; roadshows are not held; preferential allocations are negligible; and institutional investing is low. We also examine the relationship between underpricing and secondary selling in the IPO by existing shareholders and the relationship between underpricing and seasoned offerings in the year following the IPO. Although average underpricing and the high variation of underpricing are similar to findings for U.S. IPOs, we find no evidence that issuing firms or existing shareholders anticipate the extent of underpricing. The results raise important questions about interpretations of IPO underpricing in the U.S. We consider a broad range of competing, but non-mutuallyexclusive, hypotheses about underpricing and partial adjustment. Japan's auction-method evidence is most consistent with a quasi-contractual allocation of risk related to initial mispricing where, in exchange for guaranteeing a minimum price to the issuer, the underwriter participates in upside performance. We cannot exclude the possibility that underpricing is affected by agency cost and prospect theory considerations similar to those suggested by Ritter and Welch (2002) in their review of the U.S. IPO market.
1 Under JASDAQ regulations, the number of shares any investor could buy in either tranche was severely limited and investors who were likely to have private information about value were precluded from participating in the auction. Nonetheless, the public offer tranche routinely was underpriced.
In addition to systematic underpricing, we find a pattern of "partial adjustment" that is similar to that of U.S. IPOs. That is, compared to the reservation price for the auction tranche (the "minimum bid"), adjustment of the offer price for the public offer tranche was a positive function of evidence of excess demand. Because underpricing also is positively related to excess demand and to the magnitude of the price adjustment, the adjustment is only partial.
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These results raise important questions about interpretations of IPO underpricing in the U.S. In contrast to Japan's auction method, IPOs in the U.S. are priced by a process that includes book building. Several well-established hypotheses about underpricing are based on information asymmetry or information production. Hanley (1993) , for example, interprets partial adjustment as evidence that underpricing compensates informed investors for revealing private information. However, in Japan, we find similar patterns of underpricing and partial adjustment even in a market where investor information differences are not important; roadshows are not held; preferential allocations to any single investor are small; and institutional investing is low.
1 Though the auction procedure still is available, no issuer has selected it since the end of our sample period. 2 In a study of U.S. Treasury auctions, Goldreich (1998) shows that expected underpricing is necessary to induce bidding in discriminatory auctions. That result implies that the IPO aftermarket price will be above the weighted average successful bid price, but does not explain why the public offer tranche is discounted from the weighted average successful bid or why price adjustment and underpricing are positively correlated.
We consider a range of competing, non-mutually-exclusive, hypotheses for underpricing and partial adjustment. The auction-method evidence establishes that patterns similar to those observed for U.S. book-built offerings also are produced for the public offer tranche of a hybrid auction method where both information asymmetry and information production are restrained aggressively. Thus, while any number of information-related hypotheses is sufficient to generate underpricing and partial adjustment, none is necessary.
The magnitudes and variation of underpricing in our sample are similar to those reported for U.S. IPOs. The average initial return for the public offer tranche is 11.50 percent of offer price. As in the U.S., a small but material fraction of the public offers have initial returns of 50 percent or more. Others have initial returns that are negative or zero. To determine whether issuers anticipate the extent of underpricing, we examine the relationship between realized underpricing and the occurrence of seasoned equity offerings ("SEOs") in the year following the IPO. To determine whether insiders anticipate the magnitude of underpricing, we examine the relationship between underpricing and secondary selling in the IPO. We find no evidence that issuers or selling shareholders in Japan anticipate the extent of underpricing.
The Japan evidence is most consistent with a quasi-contractual allocation of risk related to initial mispricing. In exchange for guaranteeing the minimum bid price to the issuer, the underwriter participates in upside performance through lower selling costs and the opportunity to make (small) allocations of underpriced public-offer-tranche shares to preferred customers.
Because average underpricing is about three times as great as the underwriter's fee and because some IPOs are severely underpriced, underpricing and risk allocation may be affected by agency cost considerations Welch, 2002, and Ritter, 2004) , prospect theory arguments (Loughran and Ritter, 2002) , or regulatory constraints.
In Section 1 we describe Japan's hybrid auction procedure. In Section 2 we describe the data and provide cross-sectional characteristics of the sample. In it, we examine offering characteristics in the context of alternative theories of partial adjustment. Section 3 provides estimates of underpricing and partial adjustment equations. In Section 4 we examine seasoned offerings and long-run returns to test whether issuers anticipate underpricing and whether underpricing is used to signal quality. Also, to test whether selling shareholders anticipate the observed cross-sectional differences in offer price discounting, we examine their choices to sell in the IPO and to select between selling in the auction or the public offer. In Section 5 we discuss the implications of the evidence for a wide range of existing hypotheses of underpricing.
Japan's Hybrid Auction Process
Japan implemented its hybrid auction procedure in 1989, intending to improve distribution and pricing. 3 During the period of our study, JASDAQ required that the minimum offer size be at least 250,000 shares plus 12.5 percent of outstanding shares. 4 At least 50 percent were required to be offered in the auction. The auction failed if investors bid for less than 25 percent of total shares offered.
5
JASDAQ IPOs during our sample period usually were combined offerings that included primary shares sold to raise capital for the issuing firm and secondary shares sold by "selling shareholders." On average, secondary sales accounted for about 40 percent of shares offered.
The proportion of secondary to primary shares determined the tranche in which the secondary 3 See Beierlein and Kato (2003) , Hamao, Packer and Ritter (2000) , Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1996) , Kutsuna and Smith (2003) , Pettway and Kaneko (1996) , and the report of Shoken Torihiki Shingikai (Securities and Exchange Council) (1989) for details on Japan's IPO market before and after the auction regime and for review of the events that led to adoption of the auction method. 4 Financial firms with large numbers of shares outstanding were exempt from this requirement. 5 Overwhelmingly, issuers set the auction tranche at the 50 percent minimum. Those that auctioned more than 50 percent tended to do so because secondary shares comprised more than 50 percent of the offering and were required to be offered in a single tranche. While our database does not include failed offerings, the evidence suggests that failure was rare or non-existent. The auction tranches of all but three issues were fully subscribed or oversubscribed by auction bids. The lowest of the three that were not fully subscribed still was 80 percent subscribed, well above the minimum necessary to prevent failure of the auction. The requirements of the hybrid auction procedure are documented in the report of Shoken Torihiki Shingikai (Securities and Exchange Council) (1995).
shares were sold. If secondary shares represented more than 50 percent of total offered shares, then secondary shares were sold in the auction and selling shareholders received proceeds based on the weighted average price in the auction. If secondary shares represented less than 50 percent, then secondary shares were sold in the public offer and selling shareholders received proceeds based on the offer price. If secondary shares represented exactly 50 percent, then selling shareholders, as a group, could elect whether to sell in the auction or in the public offer.
Under the auction-regime procedure, a preliminary prospectus was published about 14 days before the auction. The prospectus contained no information on pricing. About 10 days later, shares allocated to the auction were offered using a "first-revised" prospectus. This prospectus specified a reservation price below which bids would not be accepted. This minimum bid was determined by a required formula that the underwriter applied to the market prices and financial data of a small selection of public companies that the underwriter had identified as "comparable." 6 Auction-regime regulations occasionally changed but were consistent during the period of our study. During this period the formula required that the minimum bid be set at 85 percent of the market value estimated using the formula. Three or four days after the firstrevised prospectus was circulated, a one-day discriminatory auction occurred. At the close of the auction, shares were allocated to highest bidders first, until the entire allocation was distributed or the minimum bid was reached. About four days later, the underwritten offering of the remaining shares took place, using a "second-revised" prospectus and an offer price set by the underwriter. The weighted average successful bid was the maximum price the underwriter could set. The minimum price was the reservation price from the auction.
7
The auction regulations were designed to achieve wide participation by small and uninformed investors. Specifically: 6 The formula is documented in the report of Shoken Torihiki Shingikai (Securities and Exchange Council) (1989) . 7 See the report of Shoken Torihiki Shingikai (1995).
• Employees of the issuer, the ten largest shareholders, employees of securities companies, and companies that owned the issuer's equity or debt were precluded from bidding.
• Generally, a participant could bid to acquire no more than 5,000 shares (five round lots). At the average offer price, the maximum corresponds to about 10 million yen or $100,000.
• An investor could acquire no more than 5,000 shares in the public offering (a combined maximum of 10,000) and could participate in no more than four public offerings per year.
While they encouraged participation by small investors, the regulations also limited the incentives of insiders and institutions to develop information on issues or devote resources to valuation, impeded free riding on price discovery, and discouraged institutional participation. As consequences, underwriters could not make large allocations of underpriced shares to any single investor and institutional investors generally did not participate in the IPO market.
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The underwriter's role in developing information for pricing of both tranches necessarily was limited. For the auction, the first revised prospectus included the minimum bid and information on the issuer's track record. 9 For the public offer, the second revised prospectus provided information on the auction, including number and size of bids, weighted average successful bid, weighted average bid, and minimum successful bid. The underwriter used auction information to determine the offer price. However, because bidders were uninformed, the auction conveyed little to the market, except for information on aggregate demand.
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In addition, before 2002, underwriters could not use over-allotment options to adjust the size of the public offer and could not over-sell as a way to assure the success of an offering or to 8 Based on a study of 110 JASDAQ IPOs in 1996 , Tamura (1997 reports that institutions purchased 11.7 percent of auction tranche shares and 13.7 percent of public offer tranche shares. Individuals purchased the remaining shares. 9 While the underwriter could engage in due diligence, an agreement among underwriters to restrict fees to an artificially low percentage also may have constrained the information-production efforts underwriters. During the sample period, fees were fixed informally at 3.1 percent of gross proceeds plus two yen, although slightly higher fees of 3.3 percent to 3.5 percent sometimes were charged. 10 Pettway and Kaneko (1996) establish that the formula-based minimum bid requires minimal information collection efforts by the underwriter and is not very informative about the underwriter's assessment of value.
offset pricing errors. Although a growing literature indicates that over-allotment and preferential allocation of shares may play important roles in explaining some unresolved questions about IPO underpricing, these approaches to managing the risks of mispricing were specifically excluded or severely constrained in Japan's hybrid auction regime.
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Evidence of Underpricing and Partial Adjustment
Data Sources
From the start of 1995 until the introduction of book building in October 1997, 321
JASDAQ firms used the auction method to go public. For these, we obtain issue and financial data from the Research Group for Disclosure database (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) . Issue data include offer date, shares issued, amount raised, offer price, first aftermarket price, and other offering details.
Financial data include sales revenue, equity book value, shares outstanding, firm age, and number of employees for the year before the offering. Toyo Keizai Inc. provides daily stock price data. We use the daily JASDAQ Index as a measure of market performance.
Japan's Auction-Method Analog to the Filing Range
For a firm-commitment offering in the U.S., the preliminary prospectus specifies a filing range defined by a minimum and maximum anticipated offer price. By convention, the midpoint of the range is used as an estimate of the expected offer price. The final offer price is an adjustment to the filing range. Hanley (1993) segregates IPOs into those with offer prices below, within, and above their filing ranges, and finds partial adjustment, in that the most underpriced issues are those with the most positive price adjustments. Welch (2002) find similar relationships between price adjustments and initial returns.
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11 Ritter and Welch (2002) review the literature related to IPO allocation issues. See also Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri (2002) for an empirical analysis of institutional allocation issues in the U.S. 12 In the US, underpricing and partial adjustment may result partly from regulations that prevent issuers from revising the offer price up by more than 20 percent without amending and re-issuing the preliminary prospectus. However, Bradley and Jordan (2002) document that amending just prior to the IPO is common. Japan's auction regime requires only that the offer price not be more than the weighted average successful bid.
In this study, we use the minimum bid in a similar way to how these studies use the filing range. Under auction-regime regulations, the offer price could not be set below the minimum bid or above the weighted average successful bid. Initial Return is negative for the IPOs with the lowest subscription ratio. The negative return was borne by initial investors, or by the underwriter if the shares could not be sold at the offer price. 14 In our sample, 7.5 percent of the IPOs had negative initial returns and 11.5 percent had initial returns of zero. For issues with non-positive initial returns on public-offer-tranche shares, the issuer received gross proceeds per share equal to the minimum bid. For these issues, the underwriter would have incurred costs to support the market or would have acted, in effect, 13 Italicized items denote variable names that are used in the tables and in the discussion. 14 Unsold shares from the public offer were purchased by the underwriter and sold in the market after the IPO.
as the writer of a put option to the issuer at the minimum bid. Hence, non-positive initial returns are evidence of an offer price risk allocation between the issuer and the underwriter.
Bivariate Statistics
Japan's required approach for determining the minimum bid is similar to approaches U.S.
underwriters use to establish the filing range. The formula price in Japan is an estimate of aftermarket value based on financial information from similar companies, less a required discount of 15 percent. Commonly, underwriters in the U.S. use comparable firm data to estimate aftermarket value. Normally, the underwriter establishes the filing range by reducing estimated aftermarket value by 10 to 15 percent.
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Because, during our sample period, the minimum bid reflected a discount of 15 percent from estimated market value, we use a 15 percent difference between the public offer price and the minimum bid as a convenient way to classify IPOs. IPOs where the minimum bid is more than 15 percent below the offer price are more likely to have been undervalued by application of the formula. Those where the minimum bid is less than 15 percent below are more likely to have been overvalued. We refer to these subsamples as the "high-price-adjustment subsample" (181 observations) and the "low-price-adjustment subsample" (140 observations).
Offering Statistics: Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on offering, issuer, underwriter, and market conditions for the full sample and the subsamples. The significance of differences in offer prices and gross proceeds between subsamples is mainly an artifact due to classification by Price Adjustment. 16 In other respects, offering characteristics for the subsamples do not differ significantly. Statistics on firm age and size suggest that underwriters set minimum bids of 15 Our description of U.S. practice is based on a combination of published information and our review of the confidential pricing analysis work papers of 18 major investment bankers on a recent IPO. 16 Minimum Bid (not reported) is marginally significantly higher for the high-price-adjustment subsample.
established firms closer to the final offer price. Also, underwriters with low shares of the IPO market appear to set minimum bids more aggressively.
The JASDAQ run-up for the 40 trading days before the public offer is significantly greater for high-price-adjustment issues, whereas differences in five-day runup are not significant. Given that the minimum bid is established about five days before the public offer, and is based on historical data, price adjustments appear to result partly from market-wide value changes. Occurrences of seasoned offerings within one year after the IPO also are higher among the high-price-adjustment subsample. In Section 4, we use the seasoned offering data to test whether the IPOs of high-quality issuers are intentionally underpriced to signal quality.
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Price Adjustment: From Homogeneity is significantly higher for the low-price-adjustment subsample.
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Conversely, Subscription Ratio is significantly higher for the high-price-adjustment subsample.
Comparisons of the means to corresponding medians for Maximum Adjustment suggest that Minimum Bid generally was set well below expected aftermarket value, much more than the 15 percent difference suggested by Japan's regulated pricing formula. The differences between means and medians reflect strong right-skewness, indicating that application of the required pricing formula did not prevent extreme undervaluation of some IPOs.
Initial Returns:
The lower panel of Table 3 presents statistics for initial returns and underpricing. For both subsamples, mean and median Initial Return (and Underpricing) are positive. As implied by partial adjustment, the mean is significantly higher for the high-priceadjustment subsample than for the low-price-adjustment subsample.
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The panel also provides evidence that partial adjustment was foreseeable. Aftermarket
Price is almost twice Minimum Bid for the high-price-adjustment subsample, but only about 10 percent above Minimum Bid for the low-price-adjustment subsample. Aftermarket Price for the full sample is 3.3 percent higher than Weighted Average Successful Bid, and the median is 0.4 percent higher. Thus, on average, Weighted Average Successful Bid is close to being an unbiased predictor of Aftermarket Price. The ratio of Aftermarket Price to Weighted Average Successful Bid is less than one for 46.7 percent of the observations. However, the average ratio for the high-price-adjustment subsample is significantly higher than for the low-price-adjustment subsample and the percent of observations where the ratio is less than one is marginally significantly higher for the low-price-adjustment subsample. Other measures of Aftermarket Price relative to indicators of value from the auction yield similar differences.
We also consider the possibility that the underwriter may discount the offer prices of highly demanded IPOs in order to compensate for over-optimism of auction bidders. To address this, we compare one-month market-adjusted returns after the IPO. Differences between the subsamples are not statistically significant and the mean adjusted return of the high-priceadjustment subsample is more positive. Thus, it does not appear that discretionary price discounting is the result of an effort by the underwriter to compensate for over-optimism.
20 19 We considered the possibility that price discounting is motivated by longer-run concerns about accurate pricing and that issues with high initial returns may have more-negative aftermarket returns. However, following the IPO, the one-month returns of the high-price-adjustment subsample were more positive than those of the low price adjustment subsample. Thus, our conclusions are not sensitive to our use of the first aftermarket price. 20 This possibility was suggested to us by Sherman, based on Sherman (2002) and Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) .
To summarize, the public offer tranche of IPOs using Japan's hybrid auction method exhibits partial price adjustment. The IPOs with highest excess demand in the auction tranche have offer prices that are adjusted upward the most relative to the minimum bid, offer prices that are discounted the most relative to weighted average successful bid, and, as a result, have the highest initial returns in the public offer.
Aggregate Value of Initial Returns: In Table 4 below the filing range to 18.6 percent for offers priced above the range. Also, as they find in the U.S., median underpricing is fairly small but a few IPOs are extremely underpriced. That such different offering procedures yield such similar results suggests that explanations for observed underpricing patterns are likely to derive from the aspects of the procedures that are similar; most notably, the allocation of risk between issuers and underwriters.
In Table 4 , we also report mean and median minimum gross proceeds, based on Minimum Bid. These are the minimums that are guaranteed by the underwriter. On average, total gross proceeds exceeds the minimum by 46.95 percent (a median of 23.81 percent). Net proceeds are lower by the underwriter's fee, which averages 3.39 percent of. In our sample, 16.2 percent of the offerings (52 IPOs) realized net proceeds below minimum gross proceeds. In cases where the first aftermarket value was below minimum proceeds, the underwriter directly or indirectly would have absorbed the loss of value.
Empirical Determinants of Offer Prices and Underpricing
For book-built IPOs, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) hypothesize that price adjustments are based on information collected during the road show. In their model, residual underpricing compensates investors for revealing private information. The implication is that the price adjustment (from filing range to offer price) and underpricing (from offer price to first aftermarket price) should be positively correlated. Ritter (2002, 2004) and Ritter and Welch (2002) point out that partial adjustment also can result from risk sharing, and may be affected by agency costs, prospect theory, or other considerations.
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While the evidence in Section 2 demonstrates a positive correlation between price adjustment and initial return in Japan's auction regime, it does not exclude the possibility that factors unrelated to excess demand at the minimum bid may give rise to the correlation. In this section, we test whether partial adjustment can be explained by observable information about demand. For this, we use two-stage least squares to estimate a cross-sectional model of offer price adjustment and underpricing percentages.
In Table 5 , the model is estimated as a system because price adjustment and expected underpricing are simultaneously determined. Both price adjustment and underpricing depend on the selected offer price. By estimating the equations simultaneously we allow for the possibility that, in setting the offer price, the underwriter may take account of expected aftermarket price.
We use actual underpricing as an estimate of the aftermarket price the underwriter expected.
Independent variables include three exogenous measures of excess demand from the auction: Subscription Ratio, Maximum Adjustment, and Homogeneity. As controls for firm and issue characteristics, we include the natural log of firm age, the natural log of offer size, the ratio of primary shares to total shares offered, the ratio of auction shares to total shares offered, the underwriter's share of the IPO market, and underwriter fees. We use changes in the JASDAQ Index over appropriate intervals to control for market-wide changes before the IPO.
Adjustment of the Offer Price
Results for the price adjustment model (adjusted R 2 =99.4 percent) indicate that, by using demand information from the auction and our set of control variables, we come very close to 22 Although information production cannot account for a positive relationship between underpricing and market runup before the IPO, Edelen and Kadlec (2003) , suggest that the relationship may be explained by rational issuers maximizing expected IPO surplus by accepting greater underpricing to increase the probability of a successful IPO.
estimating a variant of the formula underwriters use to determine Price Adjustment. 23 Demand information from the auction that is available to the underwriter prior to setting the offer price also is available (in the second-revised prospectus) to investors in the public offer. If this information is material then the information should have an impact on the price adjustment.
Maximum Adjustment is, by far, the most important factor explaining Price Adjustment.
The coefficient on Maximum Adjustment, which also is significantly different from 1.0 (t = Rounding of offer prices may partially explain the residuals in the price adjustment regression. 24 In the OLS regression of Price Adjustment on only Maximum Adjustment, the coefficient on Maximum Adjustment is 82.1 percent, the intercept is 14.5 percent, and the Adjusted R 2 is .992. Aussenegg, Pichler, and Stomper (2003) , in a study of IPO pricing in the presence of a when-issued market, find a strikingly similar result: in a univariate regression to explain the percentage revision of the offer price relative to the filing range, the coefficient on the price adjustment from midpoint of filing range to ending when-issued price is 0.815 and is highly significant. The whenissued market is analogous in many respects to the auction tranche. Unlike our result, except when price adjustment is constrained by the filing range, they find no significant relationship between initial returns and price adjustment. They also find no informational role for book building in the presence of when-issued trading. The finding of average underpricing is consistent with underwriters leaving money on the table even in the absence of information acquisition through book building. 25 To test whether other results in the model are due to nonlinearity of the relationship between Price Adjustment and Maximum Adjustment, we estimated the system including the square of Maximum Adjustment. All other coefficients in the model retained significance. The squared term was not statistically significant (p=0.23) and had a nonintuitive positive sign. The adjusted R 2 was not increased and the F-Value of the equation declined.
Adjustment is increased, so that Offer Price is closer to Weighted Average Successful Bid and to
Aftermarket Price. The negative relative effect for the high-price-adjustment subsample is 0.50 percent. As we measure Homogeneity, more positive values indicate more homogeneity, suggesting that demand is elastic at around the weighted average successful bid price.
The price adjustment regression includes Underpricing as a simultaneously determined endogenous variable. This variable is included to test whether, after controlling for demand information from the auction, the expected aftermarket price has any incremental effect on the offer price. After controlling for demand information, Underpricing is not statistically significant. The coefficient accounts for a negative 0.24 percent relative reduction if Price Adjustment for the high-price-adjustment subsample.
Collectively, these variables account for almost the entire difference in Price Adjustment between subsamples -a 62.93 percent difference compared to a total of 63.50 percent.
The literature offers few predictions for the effects of offer and issuer characteristics on price adjustment. Although the bivariate analysis indicates that age differences are important, very few young firms issued during our sample period. 26 The negative coefficient on Age indicates that underwriters set the minimum bids of established issuers more fully. To exclude the influence of the price adjustment on offer size, we measure Offer Size as Shares Offered times Minimum Bid. With this specification, the relationship to Price Adjustment is not significant.
Primary Shares Offered
Percentage is the percent of IPO shares sold by the firm rather than existing shareholders. Although the coefficient is not statistically significant, the positive sign may imply that the underwriter is less concerned with risk of overpricing when offer 26 Kutsuna and Smith (2003) find that small firms that lacked established track records generally were unable to go public during Japan's auction regime.
proceeds go mainly to the issuing firm. Auction Tranche Percentage is the percent of IPO shares that are offered in the auction, but is at the 50 percent minimum for most of the sample. Underwriter Fees were fixed by agreement, but revisions of the formula resulted in slightly higher fees later in the sample period. Also over the latter part of the study period, declines in the JASDAQ Index appear to have reduced the magnitudes of price adjustments. The net effect is that the coefficient on Underwriter Fees is negative.
To control more directly for unexpected market-wide value changes, we use run-up of the JASDAQ Index from 40 trading days before the public offering through the day before. The forty-day window is long enough to capture the effects of using the backward-looking formula pricing approach to establish the minimum bid. The negative but non-significant estimate in Table 5 indicates that JASDAQ Runup Days -40 through -1 has a negligible partial effect on Price Adjustment. That is, it does not appear that the underwriter adjusts the offer price based on changes in the JASDAQ Index over the two months before the offer.
Underpricing
If the underwriter uses information from the auction to assess demand, then the information also can affect underpricing. Because the choices are simultaneous, we include
Price Discount as an endogenous variable to explain Underpricing. This variable tests whether, controlling for information from the auction, underpricing is predictably related to the discount adjustment. As expected by partial adjustment, the effect of Price Discount on Underpricing is negative. All else equal, the more fully the offer is priced relative to Weighted Average Successful Bid, the less the issue is underpriced relative to Aftermarket Price. The coefficient indicates that increasing the offer price by 1.0% of the weighted average successful bid decreases underpricing by 0.478% of aftermarket value. The relative partial effect on the high-priceadjustment subsample is a 2.53 percent increase in underpricing.
With Price Discount included, Maximum Adjustment has no significant separate effect on
Underpricing. The estimated relative increase in underpricing for the high-adjustment subsample is 0.39 percent. Underpricing is higher the higher is excess demand as measured by Subscription Ratio, but Homogeneity of bids is associated with less underpricing, suggesting that discounts due to heterogeneity are not motivated by lower expected aftermarket prices. 27 The higher subscription ratio of the high-price adjustment subsample is associated with a 3.65 percent increase in underpricing. When demand is elastic, as indicated by more homogeneous bids, issues are priced more fully. 28 The relative effect of lower homogeneity on the high-priceadjustment subsample is a 1.18 percent increase in underpricing.
Collectively, these variables account for a 7.75 percent underpricing difference between the high-and low-price adjustment groups, compared to a total difference of 8.37 percent.
27 Because the Underpricing model includes three interrelated exogenous measures and one endogenous measure related to excess demand, interpreting their combined effect is complex. To assess the effects of correlations among these variable, we estimated four versions of the equation, including: all four variables, only Price Discount, only the exogenous measures, and only Subscription Ratio and Homogeneity. The coefficients on Price Discount, Subscription Ratio, and Homogeneity remained significant in all models and the coefficient on Maximum Adjustment remained non-significant except when Price Discount is dropped. Thus our conclusions are not sensitive to factor loadings on these variables. To assess whether the positive correlation between Price Adjustment and Underpricing is attributable to partial adjustment based on evidence of excess demand from the auction, we used the coefficients on the three exogenous excess-demand-related variables in the underpricing regression to compute a single measure of predicted price adjustment attributable to these factors. When Underpricing is regressed on this measure and the other exogenous variables, the coefficient is positive and significant (t = 5.60), and indicates a total partial adjustment effect that is approximately 1.7 times as great as the direct effect alone. Between the high-and lowprice-adjustment subsamples, we estimate that the direct price adjustment effect on underpricing is 2.53 percent greater underpricing for the high-price-adjustment subsample and that the total effect is a 4.30 percent difference. The evidence suggests that partial adjustment is a result of the underwriter's response to evidence of excess demand. 28 This result is complementary to Kandel, Sarig and Wohl (1999) . For the Israeli IPOs they study, elasticity information is revealed after the non-discriminatory auction and prior to trading, and higher elasticity is associated with a higher initial returns. Kandel et al. interpret the evidence of high elasticity as good news related to liquidity. For Japanese IPOs, auction elasticity measures are revealed after the auction and prior to setting the public offer price, and higher elasticity is associated with lower initial returns and fuller pricing of the offer, suggesting that issuers benefits from positive surprises about elasticity.
Underpricing is negatively related to Offer Size, consistent with the scale effect, that larger IPOs are priced more fully. IPOs by high-market-share underwriters are more underpriced. Possibly, reputation signals quality, resulting in higher aftermarket values. This would enable high-market-share underwriters to underprice more without diminishing net proceeds. Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Kutsuna and Smith (2003) both note that underwriters may substitute underpricing for higher fees. Evidence in Table 5 is consistent with the ability of high-market-share underwriters to extract higher effective compensation through underpricing. 
Underpricing as a Quality Signal
Welch (1989) suggests that firms may underprice IPOs to signal quality. Accordingly, a high quality firm may undertake a small, underpriced IPO and use a seasoned equity offering to complete the capital raising. According to the argument, money left on the table at the IPO is 29 These results also may be consistent with the "underwriter persistence phenomenon" proposed in Hoberg (2003) , where high reputation, informed underwriters persistently identify and profit from undervalued issuers.
expected to be more than recouped in the SEO. Low-quality firms will not attempt to imitate, because they run the risk of being discovered before the SEO can be completed.
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Here, we examine whether the pattern of underpricing and partial adjustment in Japan is related to this signaling hypothesis. The Welch model presumes that high-quality issuers recognize they are undervalued by the market. Consequently SEOs after IPOs should be more likely when firms deliberately underprice and when IPOs are small. Because the market may not immediately perceive which firms are of high quality, immediate aftermarket value is not necessarily the best basis for assessing underpricing.
Because our model of price adjustment in Table 5 explains virtually all of the variation of price adjustment, our partial adjustment evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that auctionregime issuers used underpricing to signal quality. As the adjustment to Minimum Bid is determined almost fully on the basis of observable information, unless Minimum Bid also is used to signal quality, high levels of residual underpricing cannot function as quality signals.
To test the hypothesis more directly, we examine determinants of the decision to undertake a SEO and the long-run price performance of auction issuers. In addition, as a test of whether selling shareholders anticipate undervaluation, we examine the decision to sell shares in the auction tranche or in the public offer tranche. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms that undertake SEOs do so in response to market value increases after the IPO. We find little to suggest that issuers or selling shareholders anticipate the value increases. Rather, it appears that seasoned issues are reactions to unanticipated increases in market value.
Bivariate Comparisons of SEO Issuers and Non-issuers
The signaling models of Welch (1989) and others indicate that firms that are relatively hard to value are more likely to undertake small IPOs, and to follow them with SEOs once value is established in the market. 31 Of the 321 IPOs in our sample, 27 were followed within one year by SEOs. Table 6 hold across a broad range of classifications for JASDAQ minimum number of shares offered. The results do not change materially for 1,000, 10,000, or 25,000, above the minimum or for offer sizes of 0.1, 1.0 or 10.0 percent above the minimum.
JASDAQ-Adjusted Returns, the SEO subsample has significantly more positive aftermarket performance -an adjusted return of 40.5%, compared to -1.7% for non issuers.
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Rather than supporting the hypothesis that high quality issuers underprice to signal quality, the results in Table 6 suggest that both the issuer and the underwriter underestimated the market value of the firm and that seasoned offerings occur following unexpected run-ups in the issuer's market value after the offering. Findings are similar for the full sample and for the subsample of firms issuing the minimum number of shares in the IPO.
The Probability of Seasoned Equity Issue
In general, the signaling argument holds that, for high-quality firms, combined net proceeds from a small, underpriced IPO and subsequent SEO will exceed net proceeds from a larger IPO. If underpricing is intentional and is motivated by the expectation of a subsequent SEO, then, as in our discussion of Table 6 , the choice to undertake a subsequent SEO should be related to choices that issuers who were signaling rationally would make.
Following Jagadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993), we examine the likelihood of a subsequent SEO by estimating a LOGIT model. The dependent variable is equal to one if the firm has a SEO in the first year, and zero otherwise. Independent variables are those we hypothesize to be determinants of Price Adjustment and Underpricing. We also include the Three-Month JASDAQ-Adjusted Return after the IPO, excluding the Initial Return. Consistent with the bivariate results in Table 6 , the LOGIT regression in Table 7 indicates that the choice is not significantly explained by variables that could imply that issuers anticipated a SEO: Price Discount, Offer Size, and Primary Shares Offered Percentage. In the case of Offer Size, though the coefficient is statistically significant, the sign is inconsistent with the view that undervalued 33 Nine-month adjusted returns would have been available to most of the firms in our sample that issued within one year. A longer interval is unlikely to have influenced the decision to issue an SEO during the first year. Also, for the first 36 months after the IPO (which is as long as we track returns), nine months is approximately the point when the differences of mean and median adjusted returns between the subsamples reach their maximums.
issuers undertake small IPOs, anticipating SEOs. Thus, their earlier choices suggest that SEO issuers were surprised by their long-run performance. Three-Month JASDAQ-Adjusted Return excluding Initial Return also is significant in predicting a SEO.
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In the context of the significance of three-month returns, the lack of significance of Initial Return suggests that the market also was surprised by the positive long-run performance of the SEO issuers. 
Determinants of Long-run Market-adjusted Returns
If underpricing is intentional and motivated by anticipation of a SEO, then, if the market recognizes the strategy, initial returns should reflect the implications of the signal and should be related to choices that signaling issuers rationally would make. Alternatively, if the market does not perceive the signal, then long-run returns should be related to the choices.
The last two columns in Table 7 Return, suggesting that the most oversubscribed issues have high initial return followed by negative aftermarket performance. Initial Return, however, has no significant explanatory power in predicting long-run returns, which is inconsistent with the market partially anticipating the returns. The results suggest that investors and the market were surprised by aftermarket performance, just as they were by the SEO issuance choices. 
Source of Selling-Shareholder Proceeds
As discussed earlier, a unique feature of Japan's auction-regime IPOs is that the proportion of total shares that are offered by selling shareholders determines the tranche in which secondary shares are sold. If over (under) 50 percent of total shares are secondary, they must be sold in the auction (public offer). If secondary shares are exactly 50 percent of the offer, selling shareholders, as a group, can select the tranche. Proceeds realized by selling shareholders depend on the tranche in which they sell. Because the weighted average successful bid is the maximum public offer price, selling shareholders can always do better by selling in the auction.
The source of the difference is that when the firm sells to raise capital, the price discount is averaged over existing and new shares, whereas when a shareholder sells, they realize the entire price discount. Thus, the benefit of selling in the auction is directly related to the expected price discount. If selling shareholders expect a large discount, they have greater incentive to sell in the auction. This could arise if existing shareholders believed Minimum Bid was set very low relative to anticipated bids.
In Table 8 we seek to understand the tranche choice of selling shareholders. In the first three columns the full sample is classified by whether selling shareholders sell in the auction or the public offer. In the full sample, sellers simultaneously are selecting the fraction of shares they sell and the tranche in which they sell. So the motivation for selecting the tranche is not clear. The last three columns are for the subsample of 90 IPOs where secondary shares are exactly 50 percent of the offering, enabling selling shareholders to choose the tranche. JASDAQ Runup Days -40 through -1 also is significant. A likely causal factor is that market drift prior to the IPO is negative. Shareholders are more likely to sell in the auction tranche after market declines. In discussions with investment bankers in Japan, we have been unable to determine a cause for this pattern. Conceivably, it is related to disappointed expectations about the market and share value or to concern that the decline may continue.
From the last panel, there is no significant evidence that selling shareholders anticipated aftermarket performance and that this affected the choice of tranche. Thus, for the full sample and the subsample, it appears that selling shareholders did not select between the auction and the public offer tranche in a way that was related to underpricing of the public offer tranche 37 We can identify no reason for why selling shareholders who are selling half of the total offering sometimes sell in the public offer tranche, despite its expected lower proceeds.
compared to the auction tranche. Thus, the evidence provides no support for the view that selling shareholders who anticipate material underpricing sell in the auction tranche to mitigate the effect of underpricing on their proceeds and remaining holdings.
Discussion
Evidence from Japan's auction-method offerings raises important questions about interpretations of IPO underpricing in the U.S. In a regime where investors are symmetrically informed or information differences are not important, roadshows are not held, preferential allocations to any investor are negligible, and institutional investing is low, we find:
• The public offer tranche of Japan's hybrid auction IPOs exhibits partial adjustment and underpricing that are similar to what is reported for book-built IPOs in the U.S.
• IPO issuers that undertake SEOs within one year do not appear to anticipate the SEO.
Rather, SEOs occur in response to high aftermarket returns that were not anticipated.
• Based on their selling decision, existing shareholders do not appear to anticipate those issues that are more likely to be discounted relative to value in the auction.
In this discussion, we consider a broader range of non-mutually-exclusive hypothesized reasons for underpricing and partial adjustment. Many of the extant hypotheses are predicated on institutional arrangements that were not present during the Japan auction regime. Hence, these hypotheses cannot account for underpricing and partial adjustment of IPOs in the regime.
Hypotheses that Cannot Account for the Japan Evidence
Winner's Curse: It does not appear that Japan's auction-method evidence can be explained by the Rock (1986) "winner's curse" hypothesis, that underpricing is necessary to induce uninformed investors to participate. Rock argues that informed investors seek large allocations of IPOs they recognize to be underpriced and opt out of overpriced offerings, so that without intentional underpricing uninformed investors would end up with a disproportionate share of overpriced offerings and negative expected returns. The design of Japan's auction method prevented winner's curse by assuring the ability of uninformed investors to participate and by preventing informed investors from acquiring large positions in underpriced offerings.
Information Revelation: It does not appear that the auction-method evidence can be explained by the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) hypothesis, and related literature, suggesting that shares are underpriced, and preferential allocations are given, to reward informed investors for revealing their private information. 38 In a Japanese auction, an investor's incentive is to bid a price that maximizes expected surplus, taking into account the expected aftermarket price, and the investor's beliefs of how reducing the bid would affect the probability of being among the winning bidders. Thus, informed investors would be expected to bid below their reservation values and these bids could negatively affect the maximum price in the public offer. Further, except for giving small (5000 share) preferential allocations of public offer tranches up to four times per year to an investor, no mechanism enables the underwriter to reward high bidders.
Information Production: It does not appear that our evidence can be explained by the Sherman (2002) hypothesis that, rather than being a rent to informed investors for truthful revelation, underpricing may provide compensation to investors for the cost of becoming informed and revealing the information to the underwriter. Under Japanese regulations, the maximum investments in both the auction tranche and public offer tranche appear to be too small to induce investors to devote significant resources to producing information about issuer value.
Signaling: Welch (1989) hypothesizes that high-quality issuers use underpricing to signal value as precursors to seasoned offerings at higher valuations. Our examination of aftermarket performance and seasoned offerings after the IPO is inconsistent with the view that highly underpriced auction issuers in Japan outperform less underpriced issuers in the aftermarket, or that highly underpriced issuers are more likely to undertake seasoned offerings within the first year after the IPO. Rather, the evidence suggests that issuers undertake SEOs after increases in market value that are not anticipated by the issuers.
Cascades and Ownership Dispersion: It does not appear that the Japan auction-method evidence of underpricing can be explained by hypotheses based on market dynamics, including avoidance of negative cascades. Welch (1992) hypothesizes that pricing too aggressively can cause potential sequential bidders to ignore their private positive information about value and can result in failed offerings. The Welch model is a sequential process that could represent a sequential bid auction or a book-building process as in the U.S. The auction process, however, aggregates information about demand and appears to prevent negative cascades.
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In principle, if Minimum Bid is set too high, the auction could fail, but our evidence suggests that failure is rare or non-existent. Only three IPOs received less than one bid per share, and the lowest subscription ratio was 0.83. 40 The auction would not fail unless the ratio was below 0.50. Rather, the size of the public offer tranche would be increased. First aftermarket price was less than or equal to the minimum bid for 8.7 percent of the IPOs. The underwriter could lose money on these IPOs, since the offer price could not be set below the minimum. But in these cases, the underwriter would sell any unsold shares at market after the IPO closed.
Ownership Dispersion: It does not appear that the evidence can be explained by hypotheses based on promotion of aftermarket liquidity. Booth and Chua (1996) hypothesize 39 Amihud, Hauser, and Kirsh (2003) study IPOs on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, most of which are sealed bid, uniform-price auctions, where the underwriter specifies a minimum and maximum bid. The authors note that the process generally works like a fixed price offer at the maximum. The price range is specified in the prospectus and is circulated five days before the offering. There are no road shows and the range is not subject to revision. Although the bids are all due at the same time, the authors find evidence of herding and note that investors may share information in advance of bidding. 40 Histograms of Subscription Ratio, Price Adjustment, and Initial Returns provide no indication of herding.
that underpricing can result in ownership dispersion and promote aftermarket liquidity. Japan's auction process, however, produces dispersed ownership regardless of the extent of underpricing.
Certification: Booth and Smith (1986), Tinic (1988) , Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) , and others offer various hypotheses of underwriter certification based on the premise that issuers and underwriters have private information about IPO value. While certification arguments are not precluded by Japan's auction process, the fee fixing agreement, the limited role of the underwriter in pricing the offer, and the low level of litigation in Japan argue against an important role for underpricing as certification. Further, 7.5 percent of IPOs in our sample lose value immediately after the IPO. Unless certification applies to the average initial return, this result is hard to reconcile with certification in a low-litigation environment such as Japan.
Implications for Interpretation of Underpricing in the U.S.:
While the Japan evidence does not refute any of the above hypotheses, it does imply that alternative theories also may be sufficient to explain the empirical patterns of underpricing and partial adjustment in the U.S.
Underwriters may underprice to attract uninformed investors, reward investor for revealing what they know, and/or reward investors for producing information. However, none of these hypotheses can explain why Japan's hybrid auction-method offerings exhibit similar underpricing and partial adjustment. Also, underpricing may signal value, prevent negative cascades, increase ownership dispersion, or be an aspect of certification. However, it does not appear that these hypotheses can explain the underpricing of Japan's auction-method IPOs.
Hypotheses that are not Rejected by the Evidence
From among the various hypotheses, we are left with the possibility that underpricing and partial adjustment in Japan's auction regime reflect a quasi-contractual risk-sharing arrangement, where principal features of the arrangement may be affected by prospect theory, agency costs, or regulation and quasi-regulatory agreements. Loughran and Ritter (2002) observe that partial adjustment may be consistent with prospect theory and agency cost. Issuers whose offer prices are increased relative to the filing range accept greater underpricing because they focus on the gain they realize, and underweight the opportunity loss. Alternatively, underwriters may benefit by using underpricing to reduce direct issue costs, to compensate investors who also occasionally buy shares in overpriced IPOs, and/or to reward favored customers or attract future business. While there is no clear way, in our analysis, to distinguish between these reasons for underpricing and partial adjustment, they both may influence pricing of the public offer tranche.
Underpricing and partial adjustment, however, are not sufficient bases upon which to draw an inference of irrationality and agency cost. The alternative is that they arise from a bilateral allocation between the issuer and the underwriter, of the risks associated with mispricing the offer. The essence of the risk-allocation hypothesis is that underpricing and partial adjustment reflect a long-term quasi-contractual allocation of IPO pricing gains and losses. As repeat participants, underwriters can contribute to the efficiency of the IPO market in several ways. First, by intentionally underpricing, the underwriter can substitute underpricing for higher direct issue costs. Second, by committing to share gains from the most underpriced issues with investors, underwriters may develop relationships with investors who are willing to share losses when issues turn out to be overpriced. Third, by distributing shares of underpriced issues to prospective customers, such as prospects for future offerings, underwriters may be able to provide their underwriting services for lower fees.
As long as underwriters have sufficient reputational capital at stake, implicit contracting does not require tacit or explicit collusion by underwriters or irrationality on the part of issuers.
Under implicit contracting, underpricing is part of an effort to maximize expected net proceeds.
Partial adjustment is a bilateral arrangement for sharing unexpected gains and losses between the issuer and the underwriter, where the underwriter only realizes the gains indirectly, through its relationships with investors or its ability to attract future business. The implicit contract makes issue cost an increasing function of offer price relative to the filing range or minimum bid. This view is supported by the fact that no issuer in our sample received net proceeds below the minimum bid net of fees; 24.6 percent of the IPOs were offered at the minimum, of these, 13.9 percent of all IPOs had negative first-day aftermarket returns. For those IPOs offered at prices above the minimum, only 5.4 percent of all IPOs had negative initial returns.
In summary, we examine the Japan IPO auction data in the light of a broad range of competing, but non-mutually-exclusive hypotheses. We conclude that Japan's auction-method evidence is most consistent with a risk-allocation hypothesis. Underwriters are repeat participants in a market that is influenced by regulation and informal agreements among underwriters on pricing terms. In the context of existing regulation, they contribute to efficiency by substituting underpricing for direct issue costs, by committing to sharing gains (and losses) from underpriced IPOs with investors, and by allocating shares in order to provide lower fees.
As underwriting fees constitute only about a third of average underpricing, we cannot exclude broader agency cost considerations, as suggested in Ritter and Welch (2002) . Also, as some issues are seriously underpriced, and the underpricing appears to generate little dissatisfaction from issuers, we cannot exclude the possibility that issuers have asymmetric tolerance for over-or underpricing, which may be reflective of prospect theory or may be reflective of asymmetric risk tolerance arising, for example, from an issuer's declining marginal ability to employ offer proceeds in high-valued projects. The public offer tranches of IPOs by Japan's hybrid auction process exhibit partial adjustment similar to U.S. book-built IPOs. IPOs with the highest excess demand in the auction have public offer prices that are both (1) adjusted the most relative to the minimum bid and (2) discounted the most relative to the maximum offer price, resulting in higher initial returns. The fact that Offer Price is discounted more in the high-price-adjustment subsample is evidence that partial adjustment is discretionary, and not an artifact of offering regulations. Welch (1989) and others indicate that high-quality firms that are hard to value at the time of the IPO are more likely to undertake small IPOs followed by SEOs once value is established in the market. Consistent with this view, SEOs are associated with high post-IPO returns. However, the table provides no support for the view that issuers perceived that they were undervalued at the time of the IPO. Compared to IPOs of firms that do not undertake SEOs within one year, for those that do, Shares Offered to Shares Outstanding and Percent of IPOs at Minimum Size are similar; Offer Proceeds are (non-significantly) larger; and yen-valued proceeds to selling shareholders are similar. Results are similar but generally weaker for the minimum size IPO subsample. Table 7 Predictability of SEOs and Long-Run Market-Adjusted Returns LOGIT regression where the dependent variable is one if a SEO occurs within one year of the IPO and zero otherwise and OLS regressions of three-month aftermarket returns. Models are for all 321 hybrid auction-method IPOs on JASDAQ from January 1, 1995 through October 1, 1997. The sample includes 27 firms with SEOs. Significance tests are shown in parentheses. The t-statistics for the LOGIT regression are based on asymptotic standard error estimates. Two-tailed significance levels of t-values are shown at the .01 percent (***), .05 percent (**), and .10 percent (*) levels.
LOGIT
OLS Regressions
Probability of Seasoned Offering 0.173 Note: Results of both the LOGIT and OLS models suggest that SEO issuers did not anticipate that they would undertake SEOs shortly after the IPO or the positive aftermarket performance of their shares. In particular, IPOs that are followed by SEOs are not significantly smaller (Offer Size) than other IPOs, and selling shareholders do not sell significantly smaller percentages of the offer (based on Primary Shares Offered Percentage). In addition, the offers are not discounted significantly more (Price Discount) and Initial Returns are not significantly larger. Three-Month JASDAQ-Adjusted Return and Offer Size significantly predict SEOs. None of the choice variables that are likely to be related to the intention to underprice and to follow with an SEO significantly explains threemonth aftermarket returns either including or excluding initial returns and is correctly signed. Table 8 Source of Selling Shareholder Proceeds Mean and [median] statistics of sample of all 321 hybrid auction-method IPOs on JASDAQ from January 1, 1995 through October 1, 1997, and for the subset of IPOs for which selling shareholders choose the tranche in which their shares are sold. The full sample includes 70 IPOs where selling shareholders sold in the auction and 251 they sold in the public offer. The subsample includes 17 IPOs where selling shareholders choose the auction, and 73 the public offer. Statistical tests are of differences in means between subsamples. Two-tailed significance levels of tvalues are shown at the .01 percent (***), .05 percent (**), and .10 percent (*) levels. Note: The proportion of total shares offered by the selling shareholders determines the tranche in which secondary shares are sold. Shareholders realize proceeds based on the price at which the tranche is sold. Incentives to sell in the auction are greatest when high levels of price discounting are expected. The table provides no evidence that secondary shareholders choose to sell shares in the auction tranche when they expect Price Discount to be large. The results suggest that selling shareholders do not anticipate high levels of bidding, price adjustments, or price discounting.
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